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The Alaska legislature is considering 
a bill—Senate Joint Resolution 3—that 
would put before voters a state constitutional 
amendment to change the composition of 
the Alaska Judicial Council and the way its 
members are selected. The Alaska Judicial 
Council (council) functions as a judicial 
nominating commission (see Figures 1–2 on 
page 7 for the Alaska Judicial Council com-
position and selection process). The council 
plays a constitutionally-mandated role in 
the selection of Alaska’s judges: the council 
screens all applicants for judgeships at the 
district court level and higher. For each va-
cancy, the council sends the governor a list of 
at least two applicants that the council deems 
to be the most qualified of the applicants for 
the position. The governor must appoint a 
judge from this list and cannot appoint an 
applicant who has not been screened and 
approved by the council process. This type 
of process is frequently classified as a merit 
system of judicial selection.  The council 
also makes recommendations to voters con-
cerning retaining or not retaining judges as 
part of the judicial retention election process.
Currently, the council is composed of 
seven members—three non-attorney mem-
bers chosen by the governor and confirmed 
In this issue of the Forum, you will find a timeline of selected 
milestones from the Justice Center’s past 40 years (pages 2–3). 
The Justice Center continues to be a leader in civil and criminal 
justice education in Alaska, and in research on justice issues in 
rural and urban Alaska.  Over the past four decades, our faculty 
and research staff have contributed to studies ranging from the 
revision of the Alaska Criminal Code to the development of the 
master plan for corrections. More recent research studies and 
Forum articles have focused on issues such as violence against 
women, policing, substance abuse, adverse childhood experi-
ences (ACEs), the role of Village Public Safety Officers (VPSOs), 
corrections, and homelessness in Alaska. The Justice Center is in 
the UAA College of Health, and as part of an interdisciplinary 
effort examines the nexus of crime and public health.
The Justice Center is also a teaching unit and offers courses 
in Justice and Legal Studies. A high number of our graduates go 
on to graduate school and law school.  Justice and Legal Studies 
graduates are employed in federal, state, and government agen-
cies; Native corporations; law firms; and nonprofits throughout 
Alaska and Outside. Many of our alumni have assumed positions 
of leadership in the justice community.
We appreciate the support over the years of our university and 
community partners in fulfilling our mission and look forward to 
continuing our work in the challenging years ahead.
by the legislature, three attorney members 
chosen by the Alaska Bar Association, and 
the chief justice of the Alaska Supreme 
Court, who serves as an ex-officio mem-
ber. (See “A Look at Judicial Selection in 
Alaska,” Alaska Justice Forum 21(3), Fall 
2004, for a detailed overview of the selec-
tion process. See also the Alaska Judicial 
Council website for information on judicial 
performance evaluation in Alaska: http://
www.ajc.state.ak.us/retention/retproced.) 
The proposed constitutional amendment 
would increase the number of non-attorney 
members on the council from three to six. It 
would also require the legislature to confirm 
attorney members, whereas now only the 
non-attorney members are subject to legisla-
tive confirmation.
There are many different ways to evaluate 
judicial selection and retention using a vari-
ety of metrics. This article reviews selected 
existing studies relevant to the potential 
effects that might be brought about by this 
proposed change to the council composi-
tion—studies that examined judicial effec-
tiveness, responsiveness of judges to public 
opinion, and public perception of judges. 
We are not assessing the different evaluative 
criteria used by study designers. We also 
excluded studies of effects of changes in the 
law regarding judicial election campaign fi-
nancing. The studies discussed in this article 
are not exhaustive of the extensive number 
of studies conducted on judicial selection 
and retention; however, we believe these 
studies are sufficiently relevant and contain 
sufficient data about the issues raised in dis-
cussion of the proposed amendment, and are 
illustrative of the variety of approaches taken 
to evaluate the impact of selection methods 
on the quality of judicial performance.
Table 1 (page 8) outlines the variety of 
judicial selection processes for appellate 
and trial courts in the U.S.  These processes 
generally fall under the following types: 
judicial nominating commission, guberna-
torial/legislative/executive appointment, 
partisan election, and nonpartisan election.
Studies on Nominating Commissions
A change similar to the proposed Alaska 
constitutional amendment took place in 
Florida in July 2001. Florida selects appel-
late judges and fills interim vacancies on trial 
courts through the use of a judicial nominat-
ing commission that sends a list of at least 
three nominees to the governor from which to 
choose. In Florida, instead of one statewide 
judicial nominating commission, each circuit 
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Further Information on These Initiatives
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/alaska-criminal-justice-commission
Alaska Criminal Justice Commission Resource List 
Includes PowerPoint presentations on the Alaska Justice Reinvestment Initiative. 
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/alaska-criminal-justice-commission/resource-list- 
compiled-by-commission-staff
Alaska Justice Information Center 
Will guide work of Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative in Alaska. 
http://uaajusticecenter.blogspot.com/2015/08/alaska-justice-information-center.html
The Pew-MacArthur Results First Initiative in Alaska 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2015/07/the-pew-
macarthur-results-first-initiative-in-alaska
and a number of research organizations 
(in addition to Pew) are involved in these 
projects as well. The efforts now underway 
in Alaska hold the promise of decreasing 
criminal justice system costs during a time 
of severe budget constraints—as well as the 
possibility of reinvesting savings in the most 
effective programs and supervision strate-
gies for reducing recidivism and improving 
public safety. These goals promote healthier 
and safer citizens and communities, and 
help control correctional population growth 
and costs.
Barbara Armstrong is the editor of the 
Alaska Justice Forum.
3 attorney members* 
selected by Alaska Bar 
Board of Governors
3 non‐attorney members* 
selected by governor and 
approved by legislature
current Chief Justice of 
Alaska Supreme Court 
(chair)
Figure 1. Selection of Alaska Judicial Council 
Alaska Constitution, Article IV, Sections 8
+ +
* “Appointments shall be made with due consideration to area representation and without regard to political affiliation.”
Alaska Judicial Council announces vacancy statewide.
Alaska Judicial Council accepts applications.
Alaska Judicial Council announces applicants.
Numerical results from survey are tabulated and analyzed by independent 
contractor.  Written comments are transcribed.
Alaska Judicial Council interviews each candidate.
Alaska Judicial Council meets to discuss candidates.
Alaska Judicial Council votes in public session to select final candidates.
Alaska Judicial Council forwards list of final candidates (2 or more) to governor.
Governor chooses from Alaska Judicial Council list within 45 days.
Alaska Judicial Council 
circulates bar survey to 
evaluate candidates.
Alaska Judicial Council performs background 
work on candidates: assembling letters of 
recommendations, checking financial and 
criminal history records, etc.
Alaska Judicial Council 
accepts public comments, 
letters, etc. on candidates.
Figure 2. Alaska Judicial Selection Process
Alaska Constitution, Article IV, Sections 5 and 8
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and appellate court has its own commission, 
resulting in 26 total judicial nominating com-
missions. Each commission has nine commis-
sioners. Before 2001, three commissioners 
were lawyers appointed by the Florida Bar, 
three were appointed by the governor (and 
could be either lawyers or nonlawyers), and 
the remaining three were nonlawyers selected 
by the other six commissioners. In 2001, in 
response to claims that the existing judicial 
selection process did not reflect the will of 
the people of Florida, state law was changed 
to give the governor substantially greater 
power in appointing members of the judicial 
nominating commissions. Under the new rules, 
the governor appoints four members from a 
list of names submitted by the Florida Bar but 
can reject the list and ask for a new one; the 
other five members are appointed entirely at 
the discretion of the governor, though at least 
two must be lawyers.
A study was subsequently conducted by 
Salokar, et al., of judicial appointments in 
Florida from 1999 to 2003 in an attempt to 
measure the effect of this change on the type 
of individuals applying for and appointed to 
judgeships. Published in 2006 in the Justice 
System Journal, the study also analyzed the 
composition of the judicial nominating com-
missions themselves using data from publicly 
available member applications for the different 
commissions. After the change in appointment 
procedures, nominating commissioners over-
whelmingly identified with the political party 
of the governor (Republican at the time of the 
change in the law) and announced their alliance 
with, or intent to promote, conservative poli-
cies in their applications.  This was true both of 
the applicants for the gubernatorial-appointed 
positions and of applicants recommended by 
the Florida Bar, suggesting a selection bias 
in who applied for the commissions. Indeed, 
there was a dramatic decrease in the number 
of attorneys willing to serve on the nominat-
ing commissions following the change in 
procedure.
Please see Judicial selection, page 9
A party affiliation bias carried over to 
the judges selected as well. Not only did the 
number of judges registered as Republican 
(as opposed to Democrat) increase from 61 
percent to 77 percent with the change in selec-
tion process (about 10% of the judges selected 
were unaffiliated), but judicial applicants in-
creasingly listed in their application prominent 
Republican politicians as personal references. 
Moreover, the change in the selection process 
brought an increase in the affiliation of judges 
with conservative and Christian Right social 
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Supreme Intermediate Notes
Alaska JNC JNC Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Colorado JNC JNC Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Connecticut JNC JNC Gubernatorial nomination from judicial selection commission; legislative appointment.
Delaware JNC JNC Gubernatorial appointment from judicial nominating commission with senate consent.
District of Columbia JNC — Presidential appointment from judicial nomination commission with senate confirmation.
Hawaii JNC JNC Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with senate confirmation.
Iowa JNC JNC Gubernatorial appointment through nominating commission.
Maryland JNC JNC Appellate: Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Circuit: Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission and/or nonpartisan election.
Nebraska JNC JNC Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
New Hampshire JNC — Gubernatorial nomination from selection commission recommendation; appointment by the executive council.
Rhode Island JNC — Supreme:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with house and senate confirmation.Superior:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with senate confirmation. 
South Carolina JNC JNC Legislative election from judicial merit selection commission(per http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=SC).
Utah JNC JNC Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with senate confirmation.
Vermont JNC JNC Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with senate confirmation.
Wyoming JNC — Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
JNC
partisan 
primary, 
nonpartisan 
general 
election
Florida JNC JNC Appellate:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Indiana JNC JNC Appellate:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
JNC partisan election
Massachusetts
gubernatorial
appointment JNC
Supreme Judicial Court:  Gubernatorial appointment with approval of governor's council.
Intermediate appellate and trial:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with approval of 
governor's council. 
JNC partisan election
New York JNC JNC Court of Appeals:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission with senate consent.Intermediate appellate:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Oklahoma JNC JNC Appellate:  Gubernatorial appointment through nominating commission.
South Dakota JNC – Supreme:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Tennessee JNC JNC
Appellate:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Trial:  Per statute, each county legislative body has the discretion to require elections to be conducted in a 
nonpartisan manner.
California
gubernatorial
appointment
gubernatorial
appointment
Appellate:  Gubernatorial appointment; confirmation by commission on judicial appointments.
Maine
gubernatorial
appointment
— Gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation.
New Jersey
gubernatorial
appointment
chief justice
appoints
Intermediate appellate:  The chief justice of the supreme court assigns superior court judges to the appellate 
division. Such assignments are for fixed terms. 
Virginia legislative election legislative election
Arkansas nonpartisan election nonpartisan election
Georgia nonpartisan election nonpartisan election *
Idaho nonpartisan election nonpartisan election *
Kentucky nonpartisan election nonpartisan election *
Michigan nonpartisan election nonpartisan election Supreme:  Partisan nomination; nonpartisan election.
Minnesota nonpartisan election nonpartisan election *
Mississippi nonpartisan election nonpartisan election
Montana nonpartisan election — *
Nevada nonpartisan election — *
North Carolina nonpartisan election nonpartisan election
North Dakota nonpartisan election 3-judge panels by case *
Intermediate appellate:  Cases assigned to the court of appeals by the supreme court are heard by three-judge 
panels; chosen from among active and retired district judges, retired supreme court justices, and attorneys. 
Oregon nonpartisan election nonpartisan election
Washington nonpartisan election nonpartisan election
Wisconsin nonpartisan election nonpartisan election
Alabama partisan election partisan election *
Illinois partisan election partisan election
Louisiana partisan election partisan election
New Mexico partisan election partisan election *
Ohio
partisan primary; 
nonpartisan general
election
partisan primary; 
nonpartisan general 
election
Pennsylvania partisan election partisan election
Texas partisan election partisan election
West Virginia partisan election — *
[depends on county] Appellate:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Trial: Partisan election for most circuit courts, except merit in St. Louis, Jackson County (Kansas City), Greene 
County (Springfield), Clay County, Platte County, and St. Louis County.
JNCJNCMissouri
[depends on county] Appellate:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Trial courts:  The Arizona Constitution provides for merit selection and retention of judges in counties with 
populations of 250,000 or greater. Currently, this includes Maricopa, Pima and Pinal Counties. Counties with 
populations less than 250,000 may adopt merit selection through ballot initiative. Otherwise, selection is by 
partisan primary/nonpartisan general election.
Supreme Court:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission.
Court of Appeals:  Gubernatorial appointment with senate confirmation.
Trial courts:  Gubernatorial appointment from nominating commission (17 districts); partisan election (14 
districts).  
gubernatorial
appointmentJNCKansas
[depends on district]
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
JNCJNCArizona
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
partisan election
partisan election
partisan election
nonpartisan election
gubernatorial
appointment
gubernatorial
appointment
legislative election
nonpartisan election
partisan election
partisan election
partisan election
partisan election
partisan primary;
nonpartisan general
election
partisan election
partisan election
JNC
JNC
JNC
JNC
JNC
JNC
JNC
JNC
Table 1. Judicial Selection in U.S. States and the District of Columbia, by Method of Selection 
Methods of judicial selection for full terms . (Methods used to fill interim vacancies may differ.)
Methods include: Judicial nominating commission (JNC), gubernatorial or legislative appointment, nonpartisan election, or partisan election. 
* Ten states use judicial nominating commissions (JNCs) to fill midterm vacancies only on some or all levels of court: Alabama, Georgia, 
Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, and West Virginia.
Source of data: Judicial Selection in the States (http://www.judicialselection.us/), National Center for State Courts (accessed 27 Oct 2015)
partisan election
JNC
Appellate courts Trial courts of 
general jurisdiction
JNC
nonpartisan election
nonpartisan election
JNC
JNC
JNC
JNC
JNC
JNC
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(continued from page 7)
organizations and a decrease in appointees with 
liberal affiliations. Although the authors of the 
study noted that more than half of post-reform 
applicants included unsolicited comments on 
their religious beliefs and activities, there was 
not a statistically significant change in the 
governor’s appointees based on gender, race, 
or religion as between Catholic, Protestant, 
and Jewish appointees.  The Florida change, 
the authors conclude, gave the executive 
branch greater latitude in selecting those who 
will nominate potential jurists, effectively 
redefining merit selection into a system closer 
to a direct gubernatorial selection system. If a 
hand-picked screening committee assists the 
governor, it is reasonable to conclude that it 
will select nominees first for compatibility 
with the administration’s political, ideological, 
and religious views, then will narrow the pool 
based on merit and experience.
The conclusion that giving more power 
in the judicial selection process to politically 
elected actors results in an increasingly politi-
cized judiciary is not by itself surprising. While 
on a theoretical level this undermines the ideas 
of separation of powers and an independent 
judiciary, it is also not necessarily a negative 
outcome unless one can point to an undesirable 
secondary effect from a more politicized judi-
ciary. For this, one could look to measures of 
success of current judicial selection processes.
Measures of Voter Satisfaction
As noted above, each state handles its ju-
dicial selection differently. This underscores 
the need to compare the different selection 
methods. One possible measure of the success 
of the judicial selection process is through 
voter satisfaction with judges as reflected in 
the vote in judicial retention elections. In the 
2014 election, 14 Alaska judges were up for 
retention (a yes/no vote on whether the judge 
should stay in office)—all 14 were retained. 
In nearly every instance, with one exception, 
the percent voting to retain ranged from 62.3 
percent to 74.0 percent. (As a point of com-
parison, 26 Alaska judges were up for retention 
in 2012—all were retained with at least 61.6% 
(and often much higher) of the vote with the 
exception of one judge retained with 55.1% 
of the vote and against whom a campaign 
opposing his retention had been directed.) 
These results are consistent with retention 
elections from other states—a 2007 study 
by Aspin of retention elections in ten states 
from 1964 to 2006, published in Judicature, 
showed the mean percentage of affirmative 
votes for retention is consistently in the high 
60s to mid-70s. Alaska had the lowest mean 
affirmative percentage in the study in 2006 at 
64.1 percent, and in general most states had a 
higher affirmative percentage than Alaska over 
the course of the study period. Nonetheless, 
the fact that over 60 percent of the electorate 
in Alaska consistently votes to retain judges 
suggests satisfaction with the current judicial 
selection process.
The one exception to the range discussed 
above for the 2014 judicial retention election 
was for a judge the Alaska Judicial Council 
recommended not be retained, and even 
that judge received 54.3 percent of the votes 
to retain. This result was unusual. Judicial 
nominating commissions that make recom-
mendations in retention elections tend to 
have a significant effect on the outcome of 
those elections. Since 1982, Alaska voters 
have voted against retaining four out of the 
seven judges who have received a negative 
recommendation from the Alaska Judicial 
Council, though the three that were retained 
in spite of the non-retention recommendation 
all did so with measurably reduced affirma-
tive votes.  In a 2007 study published by the 
National Center for State Courts, Aspin found 
comparable results for Arizona and Colorado, 
which have similar state commissions making 
recommendations on judicial retention elec-
tions.  Perhaps more interestingly, of the many 
judges recommended by the commissions in 
these three states, only one judge was defeated 
in a retention election (and that by a count of 
520 to 510 votes). Either voters were satisfied 
with the existing judiciary, or were heeding the 
recommendations of the commissions. If the 
former, then there may be no need to change 
the judicial selection process. If voters were 
heeding the commission recommendations, 
then changing the composition of a nominat-
ing commission to increase political influence 
would likely result in the politicization of the 
selection process and retention elections.
Objective Measures of Judicial 
Performance
Complexity of Judicial Decisions
A comparison of elected and appointed 
judges in state supreme courts suggests that 
abandoning the nonpartisan appointment 
model would have consequences for the court’s 
judicial decisions as measured by mathemati-
cal modeling. In a 2013 study in the Journal 
of Public Economics, Iaryczower, et al., used 
data from 5,958 criminal case decisions by 
520 state supreme court justices sitting en banc 
(all members) to make a comparison between 
four groups of justices, where the group was 
defined by the judicial selection methods of 
their courts. The study authors found that 
differences in the method of selection and 
retention were associated with differences 
in voting patterns on decisions. In particular, 
they noted that elected justices, or those that 
Resources on Judicial Selection
The Alaska Judicial Council’s website (www.ajc.state.ak.us) 
provides information about judicial selection and retention in 
Alaska, including announcements of current judicial vacancies and 
a historical log of judicial appointments since Alaska statehood in 
1959. The website also makes available reports on Judicial Council 
research on justice administration in Alaska.
The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) collects statistics, 
conducts research and provides assistance to state courts, particularly 
in the area of administration. Its website (www.ncsc.org) provides 
an extensive overview of its work and access to its research, pub-
lications and other projects and services.  NCSC also maintains 
a website at www.judicialselection.us providing information on 
judicial selection processes throughout the nation.
The State Justice Institute (SJI), a federally-funded granting 
institute, conducts studies on a wide range of court-related issues. 
Its website (www.sji.gov) provides access to funded projects. The 
Alaska Court System has received funding from SJI for projects.
In addition, the following publications focus on judicial selec-
tion in Alaska:
“A Look at Judicial Selection in Alaska” by Antonia Moras. Alaska 
Justice Forum 21(3): 1, 7–9 (Fall 2004). (http://justice.uaa.alaska.
edu/forum/21/3fall2004/a_akjudicial.html). An overview of the 
judicial selection and retention process in Alaska, the balance of 
interests in the formal structure of the appointment process, and 
opportunities provided for participation by all three branches of 
government as well as the public.
Selecting and Evaluating Alaska’s Judges: 1984–2012 by Teresa 
White Carns, Larry Cohn, and Susan McKelvie. Anchorage, AK: 
Alaska Judicial Council, Jul 2013. (http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/
reports/jgprofile13.pdf). This report analyzes the characteristics 
of judicial applicants and the factors most closely associated with 
their nomination and appointment to the bench. It also examines 
the relationships between these characteristics and the performance 
of judges. It assists in assessing the Council’s performance by 
providing information about the consistency and effectiveness 
with which the Council has applied its criteria for evaluating ap-
plicants’ qualifications.
Fostering Judicial Excellence: A Profile of Alaska’s Judicial Appli-
cants and Judges. Anchorage, AK: Alaska Judicial Council, May 
1999. (http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/jgprofile.pdf). Results 
of the Judicial Council’s study of the characteristics of attorneys 
who apply for and are appointed to the state court bench in Alaska.
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are subject to retention elections, were more 
inclined to overturn a lower court decision 
than those who do not face retention election 
after gubernatorial appointment, although the 
effect is modest.
Measures of performance other than align-
ment with public sentiment or dominant legal 
reasoning were difficult to use in broad empiri-
cal studies until relatively new improvements 
in software applications. Studies based on 
anonymous surveys generally indicated that 
judges who have greater political account-
ability receive lower performance ratings from 
judges themselves and from attorneys, but such 
studies have their own limitations.  Two recent 
studies based on written judicial decisions at-
tempt to develop empirical evidence for the ef-
fect of selection methods on quality indicators 
of judicial work. A 2014 study by Goelzhauser 
and Cann in State Politics & Policy Quarterly 
examined the opinion clarity in judicial writ-
ing as an indicator of performance quality. 
Those authors chose opinion clarity because a 
number of state judicial performance commis-
sions include it in evaluations and the National 
Center for State Courts urges state supreme 
courts to focus on producing clear opinions so 
they can be understood by the parties, public, 
and policymakers. Drawing from a three-year 
period in appellate courts in all 50 states, the 
study included 400 salient cases (decisions 
that received front page coverage in the state’s 
newspaper of greatest circulation) and a 5 per-
cent random sample of other decisions in each 
state, for a total sample of 1,797 state supreme 
court majority decisions.  The study authors 
coded each opinion for reading ease, grade 
level, and the percentage of passive sentences 
(as a measure of complexity).
The study authors found no statistically 
significant substantive variation in clarity 
measures across groups based on methods of 
retention. However, in high profile cases that 
received front page coverage, where elected 
judges might be expected to write most clearly 
in order to communicate to the electorate, an 
analysis of the opinions revealed no substan-
tive increase in opinion clarity by elected judg-
es, notwithstanding enhanced public scrutiny. 
The study authors pointed out that their study 
sample was limited to decisions written from 
1995 to 1998; it is possible, they suggested, 
that incentives to produce clear opinions may 
have changed in light of recent increases in the 
political competitiveness of judicial elections 
following Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White—a U.S. Supreme Court case from 2002 
holding that candidates for judicial office could 
not be prohibited from publicly announcing 
their position on contentious political and legal 
issues. It is worth noting that this case does 
not apply to judicial retention elections such 
as exist in Alaska.
Judicial Productivity and Independence
A different measure of output quality was 
used by Choi, et al., in a 2010 study in the 
Journal of Laws, Economics, & Organiza-
tion of 408 state supreme court justices’ 
opinions (totaling 27,596 majority opinion 
observations) from 50 states from 1998 to 
2000. Judges, the study authors pointed out, 
expend unobservable effort to decide cases. 
The observable product of their efforts, at 
least of appellate justices, is opinions.  Using 
written opinions, the study authors sought to 
measure judicial quality by productivity (the 
number of opinions written, including dissent-
ing and concurring opinions), legal reasoning 
by citations (the frequency of citations of the 
opinion by other courts and law reviews), and 
independence of the opinion authors (writing 
opinions against judges of the same political 
party, either as a dissenter or authoring the 
majority opinion against dissenters of the same 
party).  Findings were reported related to these 
categories as means across selection method 
groups, and not on a state-by-state level.
This study found that the mean number 
of opinions written was highest for judges 
selected in partisan election systems, but that 
the frequency of citations was higher for judges 
who were either directly appointed or selected 
via judicial nominating committees.
The results of the analysis were mixed. 
Appointed judges were not, overall, more 
independent than those selected through 
partisan elected systems; but none of the 
differences in mean independence indicator 
levels were statistically significant. The 
authors found that judges selected in partisan 
elections dissent most frequently, judges 
selected via nominating commissions fall in 
the middle, and directly appointed judges write 
the fewest dissenting opinions. Dissent from 
fellow members of a political party, though, 
is not the only measure of independence, 
especially as dissents may occur for reasons 
unrelated to political alignment. However, 
further analysis indicated that elected judges 
are more likely to dissent when one party 
dominates state electoral politics, while 
appointed judges are more willing to dissent 
when there is no clear dominance by one 
party.  And, while judges who write more 
dissents generally received a higher overall 
independence score, this relationship does not 
hold true for judges in partisan election states. 
Contrary to expectations, elected judges tend 
to write fewer opinions when there is no one 
dominant party in state politics.
The authors of this study suggest that the 
different selection systems attract different 
types of people to judgeships; politicians are 
attracted to overtly political election systems 
and professionals are attracted to appointment 
systems.  Compared with appointed judges, 
partisan elected judges tend to make more 
campaign contributions, tend to attend an 
in-state law school, and tend to have attended 
lower-ranked law schools.  Compared with 
nominating commission judges, appointed 
judges have less courtroom experience, are 
less likely to attend an in-state law school, are 
closer to retirement at appointment, and are 
more likely to have attended a higher-ranked 
law school.  And, while partisan elected judges 
make significantly more political contribu-
tions to other campaigns than appointed or 
commission-nominated judges, they also make 
more political contributions than those chosen 
in nonpartisan elections. In short, the greater 
the role electoral politics plays in selection, the 
more likely that the people attracted to judicial 
vacancies will be locally connected, politi-
cally savvy people who will deliver adequate 
rather than great opinions (as determined by 
the frequency with which the opinion is cited), 
without much concern for their long-term 
reputation among other jurists.
Of course, most judges are not appellate 
court judges and justices, but trial court judges. 
The literature and most of the political debate 
has focused on appellate court judges and jus-
tices. Unfortunately, there have been few em-
pirical studies of selection method effects on 
trial judges, who are usually selected to serve 
a small unit of a state’s judicial system. Trial 
judges may produce few written opinions, or 
at least few published opinions. Depending on 
the size of their district, they may conduct only 
a few trials each year and few of their rulings 
may reach the appellate courts.  Addressing the 
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lack of empirical studies on selection method 
effects at the trial judge level is one step that 
may help resolve the debate on selection.
Politicization of Judicial Elections
One common critique of changing the 
judicial selection process to put more power 
over selection in the hands of elected officials 
is that this change will make the judicial 
selection process more politicized. Nonpartisan 
retention elections and selection processes 
represent an effort to balance the political 
aim of public accountability with the desire 
for judicial independence, which is associated 
with protection of civil liberties and economic 
opportunity. Partisan elections and selection, in 
comparison to nonpartisan retention elections 
and nominating commission selection, are 
assumed to lead to a judiciary whose decisions 
are responsive to the ideological leanings of a 
majority of the voters in the election. Voters 
select or retain judges whose ideological and 
philosophical leanings align with the majority 
because voters correlate the judge’s ideology 
with the judge’s partisan affiliation. However, 
as the role of interest groups in judicial 
selection has increased, even nonpartisan 
retention elections have seen an increase in 
informational activity by organized groups, 
increased campaign spending, political 
advertising, and media awareness of the 
importance of judicial decisions. So, would 
greater partisanship in the selection or 
retention process yield a judiciary more in line 
with the political majority?
A 2009 study by Canes-Wrone and Clark 
in the Wisconsin Law Review of the impact 
of nonpartisan elections on judicial decisions 
found that nonpartisan elections place unique 
political pressures on appellate judges and 
challenges the conventional wisdom that 
nonpartisan elections result in greater inde-
pendence from majority ideology than partisan 
elections. After the decision in Republican 
Party of Minnesota v. White, judicial elections 
of all kinds have seen a rise in issue-based 
judicial election campaigns, typically focusing 
voters’ attention on a specific substantive issue 
and criticizing the judge’s record. Related to 
this trend, judges face increased pressure to 
state their positions on issues of importance 
to interest groups. While the issues vary from 
social policies like abortion and criminal 
sentencing to economic issues like tax policy 
and eminent domain, the pressure on judicial 
candidates to “announce” their views on such 
disputed legal or political issues has markedly 
increased. The study authors proposed that, 
in the context of the “new-style” of judicial 
campaigns, judges in nonpartisan elections 
would be more responsive to majority opinion 
than those in partisan elections.
To test this proposition, the study examined 
abortion cases decided by state appellate courts 
of last resort (supreme courts) between 1980 
and 2006 in a set of states that had partisan or 
nonpartisan statewide judicial elections. With-
in their dataset of cases, they identified each 
judge who sat and how each voted, yielding 
a total of 597 judicial votes across eighty-five 
cases in sixteen states. To test public opinion in 
each state, the authors used the responses to the 
CBS–New York Times poll’s questions about 
abortion, which have been asked regularly 
since 1985. They controlled for factors such as 
the judge’s partisan affiliation, proximity of the 
decision to a judicial election, and the type of 
case in which the issue of abortion was raised. 
A clear pattern emerged from the data. There 
was no strong relationship between a pro-life 
majority public opinion in a state and the prob-
ability of a pro-life court decision where that 
state has a partisan election system.  However, 
perhaps contrary to expectations, there was a 
strong, positive relationship between public 
opinion and pro-life decisions in states with 
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nonpartisan elections. The raw data suggested 
that as public opinion in states with nonpartisan 
elections became increasingly pro-life, judges 
cast more votes in that direction, even among 
Democratic Party-affiliated judges.
This study’s findings provided strong 
evidence for the counter-intuitive claim that 
judges in nonpartisan selection systems are 
more responsive to public opinion than judges 
in partisan systems, even after controlling for 
other factors that may affect judicial deci-
sions. The study authors suggest that, even in 
nonpartisan, unopposed, retention elections, 
“new-style” issue-based campaigns attack-
ing judges’ decisions may produce similar 
paradoxical effects. Their study demonstrates 
that a system originally designed to insulate 
judges from direct partisan political pressure 
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lected in nonpartisan elections do take majority 
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unopposed, retention elections, where public 
opinion may also play an unexpected but sig-
nificant role in judicial decisions.
Conclusion
Many American believe that judges should 
be unbiased and nonpartisan, and not influ-
enced by other branches of government in 
reaching legal decisions. This, though, can be 
in conflict with the desire that judges be pub-
licly accountable and render decisions more in 
line with the values of the average citizen. How 
we choose our judges reflects this conflict. In 
other words, the debate about judicial selection 
is, as Professor Michael Gilbert recently said 
in a Michigan Law Review article, “largely a 
proxy for the independence debate.”  At least 
one study has shown that independence from 
partisanship in selection and retention tends 
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Alaska Justice 
Information Center 
Welcomes Staff
Araceli Valle, Ph.D., and Karin Thomas, 
M.S., have joined the staff of the Alaska Jus-
tice Information Center (AJIC) as Research 
Professionals.
Dr. Araceli Valle received her Ph.D. from 
the University of California, Santa Cruz in 
Developmental Psychology and her M.S. in 
E.E. Computer Engineering from Stanford 
University.  She is a former faculty member of 
the UAF School of Education and is an adjunct 
faculty member of the UAA College Prepara-
tory & Developmental Studies Department.
 Karin Thomas received her M.S. in Crimi-
nology from the University of Pennsylvania 
and formerly worked for the New Mexico 
Statistical Analysis Center in the University 
of New Mexico Institute for Social Research. 
She has an intermediate proficiency in Russian, 
and has taught English as a second language 
(ESL) in Russia.
AJIC is jointly funded by the state of Alaska 
and the Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority 
and is housed within the Justice Center.
to increase congruency in policy cases with 
the views of the average citizen.  Selection 
methods also have an impact on performance. 
What that impact would be under the proposed 
change to the membership of the Alaska Judi-
cial Council cannot be confidently predicted 
with the information available.  However, 
the studies to date suggest that the questions 
raised in the selection debate require a nu-
anced consideration of the evidence for and 
against change.
Ryan Fortson, J.D., Ph.D., and Kristin 
Knudsen, J.D., M.J.S., are members of the 
Justice Center Legal Studies faculty.
Dr. Brad Myrstol and Prof. Kristin 
Knudsen, J.D., M.J.S., have been recognized 
for their outstanding contributions and 
exceptional service to the university and 
have received 2015 Chancellor’s Awards 
for Excellence.
Dr. Myrstol, Justice faculty, Director 
of the Alaska Justice Statistical Analysis 
Center (AJSAC), and Director of the Alaska 
Justice Information Center (AJIC), received 
the Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in 
Academic Research and Creative Activity. 
Prof. Kristin Knudsen, J.D., M.J.S., Legal 
Studies faculty in the Justice Center, received 
the Chancellor’s Award for Excellence in 
Teaching.
Prof. Deb Periman, J.D., Legal Studies 
Program Coordinator in the Justice Center, 
was recently promoted to Professor of 
Justice.  Professor Periman is also the Legal 
Studies Program Coordinator. Her areas 
of focus are legal writing, regulation of 
nonlawyer professionals and unauthorized 
practice of law, and collateral consequences 
of criminal convictions/offender reentry.
Prof. Jason Brandeis, J.D., Legal 
Studies faculty in the Justice Center, 
recently received promotion to Associate 
Professor of Justice with tenure. His areas 
of focus are civil liberties, constitutional 
law, legal education, and marijuana law 
and policy.
